Although the siege of Tarifa had gone on through the winter of 1811-12 the action at Arroyo dos Molinos had effectively brought the campaign of 1811 to a close. The French Army in Spain was now commanded by Marshal Auguste Marmont, Massena having been recalled to France by Napoleon in May of 1811. But if Marmont thought that Wellington's men were to spend the winter months in cantonments he was to be much mistaken.

Wellington, in fact, had already begun a `campaign' of disinformation which was intended to deceive Marmont into believing that there would be no further Allied operations until the spring. Whilst Wellington's various `correspondents' throughout Spain disseminated false information regarding the Allies so-called inactivity Wellington himself purposely leaked exaggerated reports of the numbers of Allied sick and wounded in the hospitals, senior officers were allowed to go home on leave and the army itself was kept purposely scattered. All this led Marmont into believing that he was secure until the spring whereas in fact Wellington was busy making arrangements for a lightning thrust against the two French-held fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz.

Wellington's siege train was brought up in secrecy to Almeida and having satisfied himself that all was ready for the siege he began his advance forward on January 4th amidst heavy snow and cold, biting rain. On January 8th 1812 Wellington arrived before the walls of Ciudad Rodrigo and so began the first of the year's two bloody but successful sieges.

Ciudad Rodrigo stands on a low hill close to the right bank of the Agueda and is enclosed by ramparts and a wall about thirty-two feet high. On the southern side of the town the ground falls sharply away to the riverbank whilst about two thousand yards to the north of the town there runs a low ridge which runs parallel to the town's walls called the Lesser Teson. About 400 yards north of this ridge lies another larger and higher ridge called the Greater Teson. This particular ridge is about thirteen feet higher than the walls of the town and was, therefore, the obvious place on which to position the siege guns. A small redoubt was built on the Greater Teson to prevent this but on the night of January 8th it was stormed by two companies each from the 43rd, 52nd and 95th Rifles, supported by two companies of Portuguese Caçadores.

Siege warfare was loathed by Wellington's infantry for it was they who had to carry out the laborious and tiresome task of digging the parallels, or trenches, and of constructing batteries for the guns. Wellington possessed no sappers or miners and had to rely solely on the brawn of the infantry who disliked the work intensely. It was an unpleasant and at times dangerous occupation as the digging was carried out all the while under fire and at both Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz was accompanied by atrocious weather conditions that made life more than unpleasant for the men. Each division took turns digging, each spending twenty-four hours in the trenches before being relieved by the next division. Even the two Guards battalions were not spared the rigours of this work.

The works progressed so well that on January 14th General Barrie, commander of the garrison, ordered a sortie to be made which was duly delivered at 11 o'clock that morning. It was driven back by the working parties but not before great lengths of trenches had been filled in and valuable entrenching tools carried off. That same night three companies of the 40th Regiment stormed the convent of San Francisco which was being used as a outpost by the garrison.

By the morning of January 19th the Allied siege guns had blasted two breaches in the walls of the town which prompted Wellington to issue orders that the town be stormed that very night. Throughout the rest of the day the Allied guns turned their sights upon the defences and on the areas behind the breaches in order to prevent the French from retrenching there. many of the town's guns were silenced also during the day.

Wellington drew up his plans for the assault whilst sitting in one of the forward trenches. The orders meant that Picton's 3rd Division would storm the larger of the two breaches whilst Craufurd's Light Division would storm the Lesser Breach. These two assaults were to be preceded by two diversionary attacks, one by Lieutenant Colonel O'Toole who, with the light company of the 83rd and the 2nd Caçadores, was to cross the Agueda by the old Roman bridge and make an attack on the outwork in front of the castle. Campbell's brigade would make the second diversionary attack, assisting the 3rd Division by entering the main ditch and clearing away the outer French defences as far as the Great Breach.

When news of the impending storm spread through the British camp there was a flood of volunteers for the `forlorn hope', the almost-suicidal unit that preceded the main assault columns. For any subaltern who led and survived the `hope' there was the chance of promotion but more often than not it meant a quick death, either by musket ball or by cannon shot. Quite often, the `forlorn hopes' were swept away in an instant at the first deadly blast of the enemy guns but despite this there was a clamour to join the `hope' and many were left disappointed.

The Light Division, which was to storm the Lesser Breach, formed up beneath the walls of the convent of San Francisco and as his men stood and listened Robert Craufurd, `Black Bob' to his men, addressed them, saying, "Soldiers, the eyes of your country are upon you. Be steady, be cool, be firm in the assault. The town must be yours this night....No lads, for the breach!" It was to be the last time that Craufurd spoke to his men for he was mortally wounded shortly afterwards, leading his men into the attack.

The storming of Ciudad Rodrigo got underway with the two diversionary attacks which were executed with precision and shortly afterwards the main assault began. The Great Breach was a mass of debris up which the British troops began to scramble in the face of a withering fire from within. The head of the British column was smashed into a bloody mess by the French guns whilst a storm of shot and shell, musketry and grenades whistled through their ranks. The breach was difficult to get to on account of two ditches which the French had cut, ten feet wide and ten feet deep, and all manner of crows' feet, spikes and chevaux-de-frises were laid in the breach to make it even more impassable. Two guns were mounted above these cuts to sweep the ditch below and with each blast thinned the ranks of the 3rd Division. In spite of this stiff and stubborn opposition the breach was mounted by the men of the 88th who surged forward, throwing down their muskets and using their bare hands to climb up. They attacked the gunners using only their bayonets and before the guns could fire a third time they had been silenced. Picton's men stormed forward and began to crowd the ramparts when suddenly, beneath them, a huge mine exploded sending hundreds of them spinning backwards whilst scores were tossed into the air, their burned and blackened bodies falling back onto their comrades below.

At the Lesser Breach, meanwhile, the Light Division had been pressing on with their attack. Craufurd's men swept forward and fought their way to the top of the breach but at a cost. Craufurd himself was hit and thrown backwards by a musket ball that passed through his arm, broke his ribs, passed through his lungs and lodged close to his spine. Craufurd lingered in some agony before dying on January 24th. His death was perhaps the greatest loss suffered by Wellington during the war. His division, meanwhile, had entered the town, so quickly in fact that many of them were either killed or wounded by the same great mine that had accounted for hundreds of the 3rd Division at the Great Breach.

A few hours after the storming had begun the town was in Wellington's hands. There was some disorder in the town afterwards but this was nothing compared to that which was to occur three months later at Badajoz and the trouble was quickly brought under control by Wellington's officers.

The siege and storming of Ciudad Rodrigo had cost the army some nine officers killed and 70 wounded whilst 186 men were killed and 846 wounded. Of these, 59 officers and 503 men became casualties during the actual storming. The French garrison numbered 2,000 at the beginning of the siege of which 60 officers and 1,300 men were taken prisoner. 8 officers were killed and 21 wounded and about 500 men were either killed or wounded.