With all three signatories of the Convention of Cintra having been recalled to England the British Army in Portugal was left under the command of Sir John Moore. His force numbered around 30,000 and on October 6th 1808 he received orders from London to march north from Lisbon to join up with a further 10,000 troops who were on their way to Portugal under the command of Sir David Baird. Once united with Baird Moore was to act in conjunction with the Spaniards who were holding positions on the Ebro river although the British government had not stipulated how this was to be done. And so in mid-October Moore, having left 10,000 British troops behind to defend Portugal, began his march north towards Salamanca.

As his army marched north Moore was assured by the Spaniards that all Spain was ready to rise against Napoleon - who had come in person to enforce his brother's authority and drive the British into the sea - provided substantial British help was to be had. Moore, however, had no experience of dealing with the very brave but very proud Spaniards, who never did today what they could leave until tomorrow. There was no effective insurgent Spanish government and the Juntas that sprang up everywhere claiming to act in the name of the absent king were composed of jealous local magnates, each of which appointed his own general, while all Spanish generals considered it as beneath their dignity to accept orders from an English heretic.

The tired and weary British troops began to trundle into Salamanca on November 13th but fifteen days later came the news that Napoleon, at the head of 200,000 troops, had smashed the Spanish armies. Moore, waiting at Salamanca and still not having been joined by Baird, had to decide whether to retreat, which would leave a hopeless situation, or to advance right across Napoleon's lines of communication, his objective being to relieve the pressure on the Spanish capital Madrid which he still thought lay in Spanish hands. This might force Napoleon to move against him and thus allow the Spaniards to reorganise their revolts against the French. Moore chose this second course and so began his bold march across Napoleon's front. However, unbeknown to him, the capital had already fallen. Napoleon duly moved against the British but the promised Spanish risings either did not occur or were easily suppressed and Moore, in the depths of winter, was forced into a fighting retreat to Corunna, where transports were to assemble to bring away the British army.

After what seemed like weeks of marching and counter-marching both Baird's and Moore's forces concentrated at Mayorga on December 20th and the following morning the first of Paget's two fine cavalry actions was fought. An enemy force of light cavalry, acting as a screen for the main French army, lay at Sahagun, just a tempting nine miles beyond the British piquets. The prospect of a daring surprise attack on the French cavalry was enough to warm the blood of many a freezing British trooper and long before dawn on the morning of December 21st Paget was in the saddle along with the 10th and 15th Hussars bound for Sahagun.

The French cavalry commander, Debelle, had neglected to post any vedettes other than a guard on the main road. The guard was quickly surrounded and taken before it realised what was happening although one French trooper did manage to escape and rode hell for leather back to Sahagun to raise the alarm. Within minutes the place was a hive of activity as trumpets stirred the shivering French troopers into life. Paget immediately ordered General Slade to charge into the town with the 10th Hussars while he himself took the 15th Hussars and dashed round to the rear of the place in order to sever the French cavalry's escape route. Without waiting for the 10th Hussars, who had yet to appear, Paget formed his own troopers and with a cheer charged straight into the town. The two French regiments, the 8th Dragoons and 1st Provisional Chasseurs, were still in the act of forming and the sudden appearance of Paget's sabre-wielding troopers had an unsettling effect on them. Debelle had twice as many men as Paget but this counted for nothing as the 15th Hussars crashed into the chasseurs, hurling them backwards and causing the dragoons to turn and run. The British hussars quickly warmed to their task and hacked and hewed their way through the enemy ranks to leave thirteen officers - including two lieutenant colonels - and 157 men killed, wounded or taken prisoners at a cost to themselves of just fourteen casualties.

On December 29th, eight days after Sahagun, Paget fought another splendid cavalry action which, although not being credited as an `honour', reaffirmed Paget as the most gifted British cavalry commander of the war. The action was fought at Benavente as Lefebvre-Desnouettes, commanding the cavalry of the French Imperial Guard, pressed hard on the heels of the retreating British Army. The French cavalry were being held at bay by a small number of British cavalry at the bridge over the Esla at Castro Gonzalo prompting Lefebvre to ride downstream to look for another way across. This was done by way of a ford a few hundred yards from the bridge and soon the French commander had crossed along with four squadrons of chasseurs of the Guard, numbering about 600 men. The rest of the French cavalry, meanwhile, looked for other fords across the river.

No sooner had Lefebvre crossed the river than he found himself faced by about 130 men of the 18th Light Dragoons who had ridden down to meet them. After a brief flurry of skirmishing the British cavalry retired and were joined by a troop of the 3rd Dragoons, King's German Legion. The two units charged once more and this time cut their way through the French first line before fighting their way out of the melee in the face of overwhelming enemy numbers. The British cavalry withdrew a second time, falling back upon the town of Benavente where Lord Paget waited with the 10th Hussars who were hidden out of sight. Lefebvre's chasseurs came on with confidence towards Benavente, totally unaware of the 450 British hussars who lay in wait for them. Along with the 200-odd men of the 18th Light Dragoons and the 3rd Dragoons KGL, Paget's hussars now outnumbered the French. When Lefebvre had been lured a sufficient distance away from the bridge and his supports Paget gave the order to charge and all at once the British cavalrymen came whooping down upon their startled French adversaries. The ensuing fight went the way of Paget's cavalry who set about the chasseurs with their sharp, curved sabres, while the 3rd Dragoons chopped down with their heavier, straight-bladed swords, cutting off limbs and breaking heads and bones.

The French were soon in full retreat and were chased for a full two miles back to the bridge across the Esla, leaving behind 55 killed and wounded as well as 72 prisoners. Lefebvre-Desnouettes was himself taken prisoner by trooper Grisdale of the 10th Hussars when the French commander's horse refused to swim across the water. British casualties numbered about fifty and most of those were amongst the 18th Light Dragoons and 3rd Dragoons KGL, the 10th Hussars coming through the fierce action virtually unscathed.

The remaining units of French cavalry had been unsuccessful in trying to find a way across the river and gave up the attempt when a few rounds from a British horse artillery battery were thrown in amongst them. This left Paget as victor upon the field, and victor of a fight witnessed by the Emperor Napoleon himself who watched, exasperated, from a distance. With the pursuing French having been dealt a bloody nose Moore's rearguard was allowed to continue its retreat, unhindered for the time being, towards Astorga, the next port of call upon the long, terrible road to Corunna. The action at Benavente was not given the status of an official battle honour although a clasp was given to the survivors when the General Service Medal was awarded in 1847.

Lord Henry Paget had proved himself beyond doubt the finest British cavalry commander but his presence in the Peninsula was only brief and ended upon his return to England in January 1809. Indeed, he returned to see active service with the army only in time for Waterloo where he commanded the cavalry with great distinction, he himself losing a leg towards the end of the great battle. His absence from Wellesley's army during the rest of the Peninsular War was due to the fact that he had eloped with Wellesley's sister-in-law and as such was hardly likely to be welcomed as a `brother in arms'. His absence was sorely felt and it was to prove a major disadvantage to the British Army in the Peninsula.